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Guerard and Sinkler: Public Corporations

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
THEODORE

B. GUERARD and HUGER SINKLER*

Right to Condemn Land Devoted to Public Use
In the case of Riley v. South CarolinaState Highway Dept.,
the Court had before it the question whether the State Highway Department under its statutory power of eminent domain can condemn for a highway, land which is already devoted to another public use, in this case an orphanage.
The property in question had been acquired for the establishment of an orphanage by the Trustees of the John K.
Crosswell Home, who had erected suitable buildings thereon.
The trustees instituted this action to enjoin the State Highway Department and the city of Sumter from condemning
a ninety foot strip through the property for a proposed relocation of U. S. Route 15.
Advanced in support of the Trustees' position was the decision in County Bd. of Comm'rs. v. Holladay2 where the Court
had held that under the general rule a public body, acting
under the general power of eminent domain granted it by
statute, is not empowered to condemn property already devoted to a public use and that such power must be specifically
given by the Legislature.
In the case under review the Court recognized the general
rule laid down in the Holladay case, but said that the general
rule does not apply against the sovereign itself, the State of
South Carolina, which in this case was acting through one of
its agencies, the State Highway Department.
The decision held in the alternative that, although the general rule should be given effect, the power of condemnation of
the orphanage's property is necessarily implied from the statutory authority granted the State Highway Department to
condemn property. The Court reasoned:
In determining whether there is such implication, due
consideration must be given to the nature and situation
*Sinkler, Gibbs and Simons, Charleston, S. C.
1. 238 S. C. 19, 118 S. E. 2d 809 (1961).
2. 182 S. C. 510, 189 S. E. 885 (1937).
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of the proposed work, and the impracticability of constructing it without encroaching on land already used by
the public... A public highway cannot in the nature of
things be constructed for any considerable distance
through an inhabited country, without crossing property
devoted to some other public use. Certainly the Legislature never intended that property of the nature involved should be excluded from the broad power of the
condemnation given.
The opinion here is sound and the reasoning that there is
a distinction between the power of the State itself and the
power of its lesser units is well taken.
County Can Lawfully Fulfill Agreement Set Forth In
Deed By Which It Acquired Property
In the case of Byars v. Cherokee County3 the Court had before it the question of the relative rights of a County and a
property owner from whom the County had acquired property
under a deed providing for the right of repurchase in the
event a specified use thereof was discontinued.
Cherokee County had been authorized in the Cherokee
County Supply Act for the year 1945 to expend a particular
appropriation in part "for a purchase... of a site for a potato curing house.., and the title of the said property shall
be taken in the name of Cherokee County."4 Pursuant to this
authorization, the County acquired .415 of an acre of land
from the plaintiff, W. F. Byars, by deed containing the following proviso:
Provided that in case the said lot of land shall cease to
be used by the County of Cherokee for curing house purposes that the said Forrest Byars shall have the right to
repurchase the said lot and have the same reconveyed to
him upon payment of the said purchase price of $50.00,
Cherokee County to have the right to remove therefrom
at any time any improvements placed on the said land
if desired.
Subsequently in the spring of 1947 the building erected on
the property ceased to be used for curing house purposes;
in 1950 the County Board of Commissioners, pursuant to a
3. 237 S. C. 548, 118 S. E. 2d 324 (1961).

4. Act No. 274 of 1945.
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duly passed resolution, reconveyed the property for $50.00 to
the plaintiff, W. F. Byars. (The building on the property had
been previously sold at public auction to a third party whose
rights were subsequently acquired by the plaintiff.) In 1957
the property was condemned by the State Highway Department and the check for the amount of the condemnation
award was made jointly payable to Cherokee County and W.
F. Byars; the latter then instituted this action to have the
court to affirm his title to the building and the land.
The County took the position, inter alia, that the County
Board of Commissioners of Cherokee County had no authority either to sell the building or to reconvey the property in
question to the plaintiff and that its actions in so doing were
void and ultra vires.
In approaching the question before it, the Court was faced
with its decision in Williams v. Wylie5 where it held that under the general rule the Board of Commissioners of Lancaster County in the absence of specific authorization could not
make a valid conveyance of County property. As in the
Williams case there was no enabling legislation here authorizing the reconveyance to the plaintiff. The Court, however,
upheld the power of the County Board of Commissioners in
the instant case to reconvey the property to the plaintiff. In
reaching this conclusion the Court held that the conveyance
to the plaintiff "was the fulfillment and the performance of
a condition stated in the deed by which the appellant obtained
title to the property in question."
This conclusion is entirely sound. Even though it might be
argued that the original legislation in 1945 required the
County to obtain a site in fee simple and without the reversionary interest which it actually agreed to, the County could
not contend on the one hand that the action taken pursuant to
the 1945 legislation was void and at the same time retain the
fruits of the contract made in violation thereof. If it contended that the contract thus made was void, it would be compelled to give back the consideration which it still held.
However, the Court goes further and apparently upholds
the action of the County Board in effecting the sale of the
building and the reconveyance of the site upon the theory of
estoppel. This part of the holding causes some concern. As
5. 217 S. C. 247, 60 S. E. 2d 586, 21 A.L.R. 2d 71 (1950).
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pointed out by Chief Justice Stukes in Powell v. Board of
Comm'rsc it is a general rule that the doctrine of estoppel
does not lie against the United States or one of the States.
The reason for this is well taken; for if the public could be
estopped by unauthorized or wrongful acts of its officials, un-

limited harm would result.
Illustrating this principle is the important decision of
Chief Justice Blease in the case of Farrow v. City Council7
In that case a city official gave out erroneous information
with respect to certain paving liens. This was relied upon by
one buying a large piece of property to his subsequent loss,
but the Court denied the right of the purchaser of the property to escape payment of the assessments, holding that the
act of the city official was unauthorized.
In the case of Bolton v. Wharton,8 an innocent purchaser
sought to recover upon certain alleged tax anticipation notes
of the city of Union which were given to provide funds to
promote the construction of a silk mill in the city of Union.
The mill was never built and the stock which the city was to
receive was never issued. Recovery was denied because the
Court found that the so-called tax anticipation notes were
improperly issued and the city had received no benefit therefrom.
No discussion of the doctrine of estoppel as applied to public bodies should be undertaken without reference to two leading cases on the subject, which were both handed down by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
In the much cited case of Luther v. Wheeler 9 written by
the distinguished jurist, the late C. A. Woods, the Court denied recovery upon a note given by the Town of Prosperity
to build a Town Hall and Guard House but did permit a recovery quantum meruit to the extent that the Town had actually received benefit from the proceeds of the note.
In a later decision written by the late Judge A. L. Gaston,
in the case of U. S. Rubber Prods. v. Town of Batesburg,0 a
recovery was allowed against the Town of Batesburg for the
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

210 S. C. 136, 41 S. E. 2d 780, 1 A.L.R. 2d 330 (1947).
169 S. C. 373, 168 S. E. 952 (1933).
163 S. C. 242, 161 S.E. 454, 86 A.L.R. 1101 (1931).
73 S. C. 83, 52 S. E. 874 (1905).
183 S. C. 49, 190 S. E. 120, 110 A.L.R. 144 (1936).
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purchase of fire hose upon the same ground, but in both instances the limit of the recovery was the extent to which the
city actually received benefit for a lawful corporate purpose,
and the recovery was not measured by the quantum of the
note or other obligation upon which the municipal corporation was sued. The distinction is extremely important and
can be applied here, for here the county still had the property
which was the consideration for the contract which it made
in 1945 (albeit illegally). Such a situation is clearly differentiated from the situation in the Bolton case where the city
got nothing for the note.
In the instant case the opinion seems to apply the doctrine
of estoppel to the action taken by the County Board in selling
the property and effecting the reconveyance. Since this action was not authorized by appropriate legislation, it is difficult to see how the County could be estopped upon this unauthorized act. Even in those cases finding estoppel resulting
from a contractural relationship, the person seeking to rely
upon the doctrine must prove the authorization for the contract. Indeed, this much of the holding seems to run contrary
to the doctrine currently applied in the Williams case. But
since the entire discussion of the subject of estoppel was unnecessary to the result, it would seem to follow that it should
be treated as obiter dicta.
Contributory Negligence of Third Person Defined
In the case of Pinkston v. Morrall,11 the Court considered
the right of the plaintiff to maintain an action for personal
injuries against the city of Beaufort in a case where such injuries were admittedly caused by the concurrent negligence
of a third person.
The action was brought under Section 47-71 of the SOUTH
CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS of 1952 in the absence of which the
city would have been immune from such an action in tort.
In his complaint the plaintiff alleged that he was injured
while loading a truck of his employer parked on the sidewalk; that a truck of the defendant city was parked behind
the truck which the plaintiff was loading and close to it; that
thereupon the truck of Morrall Furniture Company was
driven around the corner, struck the city truck, drove it for11. 236 S. C. 601, 115 S. E. 2d 286 (1960).
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ward, and the plaintiff was caught between the city truck
and his employer's truck.
The particular portion of the statute under consideration
here reads:
No recovery may be had hereunder if the Plaintiff has
brought about such injury, death or damage by his negligence or negligently or carelessly contributed thereto, or
if such Plaintiff's injury or damage was brought about
by contributory negligence of any third person ...(Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff's complaint had denied any "contributory
negligence" on the part of a third person but had alleged the
"joint and concurrent negligence" of the defendants, Morrali
and the city of Beaufort.
The defendant city demurred on the grounds that the complaint failed to allege a cause of action against it because
it alleged that the plaintiff's injury was brought about by
the contributory negligence of third persons, to-wit: MorralL.
The lower court overruled the demurrer apparently differentiating between "contributory negligence of any third person" as used in the statute and "joint and concurrent negligence" of a third party and the city as alleged in the complaint.
The respondents sought to sustain the lower court by the
generally accepted definition of "contributory negligence" as
the negligence of a plaintiff contributing to his injury as an
approximate cause without which the injury would not have
occurred.
The Supreme Court, however, in reversing the lower court
and sustaining the city's demurrer said that the term "contributory negligence" as used in the statute does not have the
meaning attributed to it by the respondent but it clearlymeans the negligence of a third person contributing to the
injury, an intrepretation which the context of the statute
clearly justifies. The effect of this decision is to interpret the
statute in question as making a municipality liable thereunderonly when its negligence is the sole cause of a plaintiff's in-

jury.
Annexation Decisions
Two decisions handed down during the period under review
consider the proceedings for enlarging the corporate limits of
a municipality.
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The case of Williams v. Jacobs1 2 considered the proceedings
of an election held for the purpose of annexing the town of
Ebenezer to the town of York. The action was brought by
certain citizens and taxpayers of the town of Ebenezer to
have the proceedings declared null and void. The plaintiffs'
first contention, that the statute does not authorize the annexation of an incorporated town, was quickly resolved
against the plaintiffs under the authority of Town of Forest
Acres v. Seigler.13
However, the plaintiffs' objections relating to the validity of the petition requesting the election in the town of
Ebenezer were sustained and the annexation was declared
null and void by the Supreme Court.
The particular Code Section upon which the plaintiffs' relied is Section 47-12 of the 1952 SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF
LAWS, which provides:
To effect any such extension a petition shall first be submitted to the Council by a majority of the freeholders of
the territory which it is proposed to annex, accompanied
by an adequate description thereof, praying that an election be ordered to see if such territory shall be included
in the city or town.
Apparently there were 307 freeholders in the town of Ebenezer; consequently, 154 freeholders' signatures were required upon the annexation petition called for Section 47-12.
The lower court found that there were 161 valid signatures
to the petition.
The signatures considered by the Supreme Court fell into
the following groups: (a) Eight married couples owned
property jointly and were counted by the lower Court as sixteen freeholders; the petitions were signed "Mr. and Mrs."
by either the husband or the wife. The signatures were ratified by both husband and wife after commencement of this
action contesting the validity of the proceedings; (b) Eight
married couples owned property jointly and were counted by
the lower court as sixteen freeholders; the petition was signed
only by the husband or the wife, and only the name of the husband or the wife appeared thereon; however, both husband
and wife ratified the same after the commencement of the
12. 237 S. 0. 183, 116 S. E. 2d 157 (1960).
13. 224 S. C. 166, 77 S. E. 2d 900 (1953).
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said action; (c) The title to the property was in the name of
the husband or wife, but the other spouse signed the petition
which was subsequently ratified by signature of the owner;
(d) The property was owned by the husband, the wife signed
his name to the petition, and the husband subsequently ratified the action of the wife in signing the husband's name
after the commencement of the said action.
The question before the Court was the validity of the
ratification of signatures to the petition. The defendants
sought to sustain the ratifications upon the principle of
agency whereby ratification of an unauthorized act relates
back to the time that the act was done and makes it effective
from that time.
The opinion by Justice Taylor, however, incisively strikes
down this contention stressing the fact that in this case there
was no obligation attaching to those signing the petition,
therefore, there was no obligation which could be subsequenty ratified. The Court pointed out that in this case
what was actually involved was a responsibility to give the
matter at hand due consideration for the sake of the other
residents and owners in the area affected. The Court, therefore, held the attempted ratifications invalid and the petition
accordingly insufficient.
Implicit in the Court's holding on this point is recognition
of the fact that a husband or wife when subsequently called
upon to ratify an act of his or her spouse after the petition
was filed would be likely to be less influenced by a sense of
responsibility for the other residents of the area affected
than he or she would be if originally presented with the
petition for signature before filing. Furthermore, the opinion expressly recognizes the practical difficulty of investigating the authority by which the names which are not the
signatures of freeholders are affixed to a petition.
Applying the same principle, the Court upheld the lower
court's refusal to add sixteen tenants in common representing four estates all of whom had ratified the signatures of
the four initial freeholders.
The action in Tovey v. The City of Charleston,14 was
brought to invalidate the annexation proceedings by which
14. 237 S. C. 475, 117 S. E. 2d 872 (1961).
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the boundaries of the city of Charleston were enlarged for
the first time since 1849. The annexed portions did not lie
within or include any municipality as in the Jacobs case but
the annexed areas were parts of St. Andrews Public Service
District. The plaintiffs first contended that St. Andrews
Public Service District is a municipal corporation within the
meaning of the annexation statute, therefore, no part of it
could be attached to another municipality without submitting
the question to all the voters in the district. St. Andrews
Parish had actually been cut into six separate areas for the
purpose of voting on the question of annexation. In four of
these areas the result was unfavorable and in two of the areas
(Areas A and C) the vote was favorable. The question of
annexation was obviously not submitted to the voters of the
entire district.
The Court recognized that special purpose districts created
by statute have been referred to in some of our cases as
municipal corporations, have been held to be municipal corporations within the meaning of certain sections of our Constitution, and perform functions usually performed by incorporated towns and cities. However, it concluded that special
purpose districts are not to be regarded as municipal corporations so as to bring them within all of our statutes and constitutional provisions pertaining to incorporated cities or
towns because it was clear from the wording of the Sections
47-11, 47-23, and 47-24, that the term "municipality," as used
therein applies only to incorporated cities or towns. Accordingly, the Court held that inasmuch as St. Andrews Public
Service District was not an incorporated city or town within
the meaning of the annexation statute, it was not necessary

to follow the procedure where the corporate limits of a city
or town are reduced, requiring a vote of all the voters in the
city or town being reduced.

The plaintiffs next contended that even if the St. Andrews
Public Service District is not a municipal corporation within
the meaning of the annexation statute, it is a corporate territory organized by an Act of the General Assembly whose

area cannot be reduced or boundaries changed by annexation
of a part of it to an adjoining city or town. The Court held,

however, under the authority of Wagener v. Smith,15 that

the fact that the legislature created a special purpose district
15. 221 S. C. 438, 71 S. E. 2d 1 (1952).
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neither prevented the inhabitants of the district from thereafter incorporating, nor prohibited them from taking steps
to annex the district or part of it to an adjoining city or town.
In the Wagener case the Court had held that the General
Assembly, which had by legislative enactment established a
township form of government for Folly Island, could not
thereby deny the formation of towns thereon because that action would destroy the generality of the laws relating to the
organization of municipal corporations. The holding on this
point in the case under review seems to follow logically from
the holding in. the Wagener case.
Then the plaintiffs contended that the annexation should
be voided because the city of Charleston had apparently
initiated and partly financed circulation of the petition by
the freeholders asking that an election be held on the question
of annexation. The Court summarily dismissed this objection
stating that there was nothing in the statute prohibiting such
activities.
Also, the plaintiffs contended that the annexation was void
because the annexed area included 321 acres of marshland
owned by the State of South Carolina. This contention likewise was disposed of by the Court in short order with the
statement that "the fact that it may be owned by the State
would not prevent its annexation to the City of Charleston."
Plaintiffs' last two arguments, dealing with the shape and
location of the annexed area, raise the most interesting questions of the appeal.
There is no doubt that the city as enlarged by the annexed
area has an extraordinarily irregular shape, and the plaintiffs unsuccessfully asserted this as a ground for voiding the
annexation. The Court noted that the boundaries of Charleston by virtue of its location between two rivers have always
been irregular. Furthermore, it stated that the annexed area
lying across the Ashley River was readily accessible to the
old city and that there was no evidence that the annexation
would cause any difficulties in the administration of the affairs of the city or result in any undue hardship to any citizen.
There is no limitation in our annexation statute as to the
extent or shape of the territory which may be annexed
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and there is nothing from which any such limitation
may be implied ....
[M]ere irregularity in shape furnishes no justification for interference by the Courts in
the determination by the voters that an annexation is to
the best interest of both the municipality and the area
to be annexed.
The unanswered question which the Court may be faced
with in the future is whether the holding in this case is broad
enough to permit the exclusion in an annexation of isolated
islands to be excluded from and completely surrounded by
the town as enlarged.
Finally, the plaintiffs urged that the annexation should be
voided because the territory annexed was not "adjacent territory" within the meaning of the annexation statute. This
last objection was urged on two grounds. First it was
contended that contiguity between the old city and the annexed area (A) was broken by the Ashley River. The Court
found that this was no objection inasmuch as the old boundary of the city of Charleston extended to the center line of
the Ashley River and the annexation plats showed that the
area to be annexed likewise extended to the center line of the
Ashley River. The Court pointed out that the river was spanned by an excellent bridge and there was no practical difficulty in making the two areas part of one city. Secondly, it
was contended that area (C) was not contiguous because it
was separated from the city by area (A) and that, therefore,
annexation proceedings for area (C) could not be lawfully
commenced until after area (A) had become a part of the
municipality. The Court noted that if the election relative to
the annexation of area (A) had been unfavorable, area (C)
would have not been annexed because there would have been
a lack of contiguity between it and the city; but that both
elections resulted favorably and the two areas were simultaneously declared parts of the city of Charleston and that
there was never a moment of time when there was lack of
contiguity between the city and the entire area which was
annexed. The Court, therefore, did not sustain this objection
and stated as the rule to be followed, "It is sufficient if at the
time such areas are annexed, all are contiguous to each other,
and one of them is contiguous to or adjoins the City."
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CompensationFor Private Water Lines Taken Over
By A Public Service District
The case of Derby Heights, Inc., v. Gantt Water and Sewer
Dist.16 concerns the right of the owners of water lines to be
compensated when they are taken over by a Public Service
District having the power of eminent domain.
In this case the plaintiffs, a number of real estate developers, had installed water distribution systems in property
being developed by them and which was subsequently included
in the Gantt Water and Sewer District created by the General Assembly in 1954. After its creation the district took
over the operation and maintenance of the water lines and
collected a charge therefor.
The developers brought this action against the district to
recover just compensation for the alleged taking of their
water lines. The district took the position that the developers
(1) had actually or by implication dedicated the water lines
to the public and (2) had recovered the cost of the same in
the consideration received for lots sold in the development.
The Court concluded from the record that there had been
no dedication of the water lines to the use of the public emphasizing a letter from the district to one of the developers
in 1955 referring to "the private water line now serving your
development." This point will more properly be discussed
under the survey of property law.
The Court held that the fact that the developers may have
been compensated for their water lines did not affect their
property interests therein for which they could demand just
compensation from the district. The Court found no merit
in the district's contention that its merely using the water
lines as they had been used by the developers constituted no
"taking" for which compensation must be paid. The record
showed that the district imposed and collected a charge.
Apparently the several water lines under consideration
were constructed at the cost of approximately $79,000.00.
The issue presented to the Court was, in effect, who was to
get the benefit of this cost -the district's taxpayers, including those lot owners to whom the developers were already ob16. 237 S. C. 144, 116 S. E. 2d 13 (1960).
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ligated to provide water, or the developers. Under the circumstances, it appears that it would be something of a windfall in either event. The developers had undoubtedly included
the cost of this construction in their development costs and
had priced their lots accordingly and the lots which remained
unsold would probably continue to benefit from the installation of the lines irrespective of the ownership of the lines.
On the other hand if the district acquired the lines, it thereby
was relieved of the cost of installing them which it would
otherwise have had to incur. The Court in upholding the
award to the property owners took a strong position behind
the right of private property. However, it refused to recognize any property rights in the parties who had purchased
lots and thereby acquired a contractural right to have the
developers maintain the lines. These persons apparently will
pay again through district taxes for the water lines serving
them.
It is important to note the limit of the holding in this case.
This decision does not establish as a principle of law that a
developer can recover the cost of installing the water system
which is subsequently taken over by the public. This decision
merely holds that the developer by providing water lines for
his real estate development does not thereby dedicate these
lines to the public nor divest himself of property rights therein. The value of these property rights in any given case was
not before the Court in this case because it had apparently
been agreed upon by the parties as the original cost of installation to the developers. In many such cases, however, it
seems that the question would arise as to the measure of compensation to be paid the developer. Under the general rule,
just compensation is the market value of the property condemned at the time of taking. However, it is equally as well
decided that it is the value of the condemned property to the
condemnee and not the value of the condemned property to
the condemnor which is controlling. It is difficult in a case
like this to see how the value of the pipes to the condemnee
would approach the cost of installation. While the pipes
themselves undoubtedly have value, in all probability the cost
of removing them from the ground would be as great or
greater than their intrinsic value. Therefore, it seems that
in such a case where the developer is under no obligation to
provide substitute lines, the value to the developer owner is
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reflected by the net receipts that he anticipates from tap in
fees, etc. This very interesting question, whether the compensation will be determined by the market value of the prop6rty condemned or whether it will be determined by the value
of the condemned property to the condemnee,1 7 is left for a
future decision.
Right To Enforce Zoning Ordinance
In the case of Aughtry v. Farrell"' the plaintiffs, who
owned homes in an A-1 residential zone in the city of Greenville, brought a suit to enjoin the defendants from maintaining and operating a laundry and dry cleaning pick-up business from a building constructed on a portion of the lot where
the defendants resided, and also to require the removal of the
building. It appears that the building had been constructed
after the Greenville Board of Adjustment had granted the
defendants a variance and that this variance was subsequently set aside and held to be illegal. After the variance
had been set aside the plaintiffs brought this action for injunctive relief.
The lower court dismissed the complaint holding that the
plaintiffs were without authority to maintain the action in
that they were able to show only general damages and not
such special damages as would justify equitable relief; further, that the plaintiffs were denied relief under the theory of
estoppel and laches.
It appears that the plaintiffs owned homes in and lived in
an A-1 single family dwelling residential zone under the
Greenville City Ordinances and in the same zone wherein
the defendants constructed the building in question. Apparenty none of the plaintiffs owned or lived in homes next
to the property on which the defendants' building was located.
However, the uncontradicted testimony was to the effect that
the value of the property in the immediate neighborhood
would be affected to the extent of several blocks. The Court
cited its opinion in Momeier v. John McAllister, Inc.1 9 as establishing the rule that depreciation in value of a person's
property is enough alone to constitute him as a "specially
damaged plaintiff" in order to bring a suit of this sort. On
17. ORGEI., VALUAION UNDER EMINENT DoMAIN § 42 (2d ed. 1953).
18. 237 S. C. 604, 118 S. E. 2d 569 (1961).
19. 203 S. C. 353, 27 S. E. 2d 504 (1943).
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the basis of the evidence it concluded that the plaintiffs
would suffer a material impairment in the money value of
their property if the complained-of-use should be continued
and that their damages are not- such as are suffered by the
public generally but such damages as are peculiar to those in
the immediate vicinity and that the plaintiffs in this case
were, therefore, "specially damaged plaintiffs."
The Supreme Court also refused to sustain the defense of
estoppel and laches. The opinion pointed out that the defendants knew from the beginning that they were seeking to construct a building and maintain a business in an A-i residential zone and that their efforts to break the zone boundary were being opposed, both by word of mouth of the neighbors who complained personally and also by action in the
court which was commenced on July 16, 1957 (construction
had been commenced some time subsequent to March 28,
1957).
The Court's holding on the point of the plaintiff's capacity
as a specially damaged plaintiff to maintain this action has,
in addition to the legal precedent cited, a sound practical aspect in that it appears in the instant case that if the plaintiffs had not sought to enforce the Zoning Ordinances, the defendants would have been able to continue their violation of
the zoning ordinances without molestation.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

